tirades against Walrasian general equilibrium modeling. Likewise, he reports Lorie Tarshis's assessment, near the end of his life, of post-Keynesianism: "With a few notable exceptions, its ambitious claims seem empty of substance" (137).
If King is willing to air the dirty laundry of post-Keynesians, then why does he not ask hard questions, such as why behavioral macroeconomics and behavioral finance have flourished in the wake of the stock market's collapse, while post-Keynesians are largely ignored? There may be many answers to this question, but the likely answer is that King is not interested in mainstream economics. He does not take it seriously. It is not clear from his argument that he knows behavioral macroeconomics exists. When King talks about the mainstream, he usually speaks about Walrasian general equilibrium theory or the work of Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow in the 1950s and 1960s. Apart from an occasional aside that mainstream economics has become ever more technical, there is little (or no) recognition that mainstream economics (whatever that hoary term might mean) is not today what it was forty years ago.
But if King is weak on mainstream economics, he tells a rich story about the evolution of post-Keynesian thought. His is not the story that many post-Keynesians would tell, for it focuses almost obsessively on Joan Robinson and Cambridge, England, and makes the best moments of post-Keynesianism those that most overlap with Marx and Sraffa. To be sure, King writes about Sidney Weintraub, Paul Davidson, and a host of other post-Keynesians around the world, but the real heart of his narrative is about the radical élan of Joan Robinson. The high point of King's narrative is Robinson's Ely lecture in December1971, when she came to the meetings of the American Economic Association and read the Americans the riot act about the Vietnam War and their bourgeois economics. The nadir of his story is the failure of her lecture to provoke the radical change in economics that it seemed possible to believe was in the wings then if people would have just listened to her and followed her lead.
The real purpose of this book is not so much to offer a critical history of the post-Keynesians as it is to try to solve the question of which groups of dissenting economists could best work together to form a viable opposition to mainstream economics in the twenty-first century. The best of this part of King's effort is the brutally honest assessment in chapter 10, "Keynes, Kalecki, Sraffa: Coherence?" In this chapter he explains how each of the three main traditions in the post-Keynesian tent would critique the other two. Unfortunately, because of his interest in building bridges, he walks away from this comparative analysis without taking any stand about who is right and who has the better arguments. He explains how the groups disagree, but never suggests which of the three traditions poses the best hope for carrying the postKeynesian movement forward.
In the end, King is willing to take anyone into the post-Keynesian tent who is sympathetic to Marx, Sraffa, Kaldor, Kalecki, Davidson, or Joan Robinson. Thus if you like radical economics and the frisson of being against the mainstream, then you would like to know J. E. King, and you would love reading his book.
Bradley W. Bateman, Grinnell College
This book is a product of the first conference of the Association des Historiens de la Tradition Économique Autrichienne, held in Paris in 1999. The first part contains papers by Hébert on Hayek and the French engineers, and one titled "Moral Functionalism" by Birner, which turns out to be a defense of Durkheim against Hayek's strictures on constructivism. The paper by Hébert also defends French engineers against the charge of constructivism, arguing that some, such as Dupuit in particular, were not guilty of this. But Hébert then attempts to build a case for the idea that Carl Menger's work could somehow have stemmed from that of Dupuit. This is not convincing. That Dupuit was not a Saint-Simon-Comte type of constructivist is plausibly argued; but the idea that Dupuit's discussion of wants, which is, typically of an engineer, project-centered, somehow leads to Menger's famous table seems to me not a small step, as is claimed in the paper, but a very large one.
In part 2, Schmidt puts forward the intriguing idea that it would be possible to construct a novel form of game theory which would be compatible with the work of Hayek. While this is not entirely convincing-game theory ultimately involves a probability distribution however it is approached, whereas Hayek's approach has much more in common with that of his former graduate student George Shackle, who eschewed probability in favor of possibility-the paper, though short, is stimulating and well argued. The paper by Aréna attempts to cover, in fifteen pages, a huge topic-monetary theory from Hayek to Friedman-in order to establish that Hayek was an opponent of the quantity theory. The account of Hayek's monetary thought is straightforward and does not differ from one which anyone familiar with the work of Fisher, Hayek, and Mises would give. But, in attempting to deal with Friedman, Aréna relies on a single reference-a congressional submission by Friedman of 1958 Friedman of -and, principally, a 1988 paper by Bellante and Garrison. The latter part of the Aréna paper seems to me fundamentally misleading. While Hayek was an opponent of a Fisher-style quantity theory, because of the derivation of his work from the Mises version of Wicksell (neither of whom are cited in the paper) with its central distinction between the price levels of producer and consumer goods, the work of these writers is much closer to that of the quantity theorists than it is to the post-Keynesian endogenous money approach favored by their opponents, not least in France. Furthermore, Hayek's later (and unfortunate) arguments for the denationalization of money do not really alter this, because they are fundamentally inconsistent with it.
